( ….. )
Sophia Bell:
What about the viewpoint of the current leader of the CCP? Yesterday, I also mentioned that I don’t see him clearly expressing his stance on the persecution of Falun Gong and the crime of organ harvesting… I read somewhere that someone shared their opinion that Mr. Xi’s situation is like the saying, “it’s hard to get off a tiger once you’re riding it.”
Could you both interpret the meaning of this saying in Mr. Xi’s case?
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia’s question and becomes pensive for a moment, his gaze distant as if trying to comprehend the complex power calculations within the leadership in Beijing.)
The saying “it’s hard to get off a tiger once you’re riding it”… is indeed a very evocative image, and perhaps it also partly reflects the predicament of China’s current leader, Mr. Xi Jinping, when faced with the heavy legacy of the persecution of Falun Gong and its related crimes.
(He pauses, choosing his words carefully.)
From the perspective of someone who was once in the system, I can imagine a few aspects of the “tiger” that Mr. Xi might be “riding”:
First, the legacy of Jiang Zemin and his faction: The persecution of Falun Gong was a major “project,” a political “legacy” that Jiang Zemin and his faction painstakingly built and maintained. This faction still has considerable influence in the Party, the military, and especially in the security, police, and judicial systems – the very agencies that directly carry out the persecution. Touching the issue of Falun Gong, especially overturning the verdict, could directly impinge on the interests and even the safety of this faction. They will not let that happen easily.
Second, the fear of “instability” and the “Party’s demise”: This is an inherent fear of any CCP leader. Admitting a mistake in a persecution of such a large scale, bringing justice to tens of millions of people, could be seen as an act of “negating the past,” weakening the prestige and legitimacy of the Party. They fear it could lead to further demands, other “historical reviews,” and ultimately the collapse of the regime.
Third, the crime is too immense to be “handled quietly”: The crime of organ harvesting, if publicly acknowledged and investigated, would be too great a shock not only for the Chinese people but also for the international community. The responsibility would not just stop at a few individuals, but could implicate an entire system. “Getting off the tiger” in this case could mean facing a “historical trial” whose consequences no one can foresee.
Fourth, the constraints of the established apparatus: The 610 Office and the entire system for persecuting Falun Gong has been operating for over two decades; it has become a gigantic machine, with countless people involved and entangled interests. Stopping this machine, dismantling it, and dealing with those involved is an extremely complex and difficult task.
So, Mr. Xi may be in a dilemma.
Either continue to “ride the tiger”: That is, to maintain the policy of persecution as it is, or to some extent, to avoid causing major disturbances within the Party and to maintain a superficial “stability.” But this means continuing to condone the crime, continuing to carry the historical burden, and facing increasing condemnation from the international community and people of conscience at home.
Or find a way to “get off the tiger”: That is, to find a way to fundamentally resolve the Falun Gong issue, to bring justice to the victims. But this path is fraught with thorns and dangers, requiring extraordinary courage, great political determination, and could face fierce opposition from conservative forces and those with “blood debts.”
The fact that Mr. Xi has not clearly expressed his views on this issue, as Ms. Sophia has observed, may be because he is weighing and calculating between these difficult options. Or perhaps, he is prioritizing the consolidation of his personal power first, dealing with issues he considers more urgent, before daring to touch this dangerous “tiger.”
However, history has shown that avoiding facing the truth, trying to maintain a status quo based on injustice and crime, is never a sustainable solution. That “tiger,” if not “tamed” or “dismounted” wisely and bravely, will sooner or later turn around and bite its rider.
Those are my thoughts, based on my limited understanding of that complex situation.
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods in agreement with Mr. Liu’s analysis, then adds a political science perspective.)
Mr. Liu has interpreted the meaning of “riding the tiger” in the case of Xi Jinping very profoundly. I would just like to add a few aspects from a political analysis perspective.
First, on policy continuity and the succession of power: In single-party systems like China, there is often an implicit pressure to maintain the continuity of major policies, especially those related to “national security” and “regime stability.” For a new leader to come in and completely reverse a major policy of his predecessor, especially a “sensitive” policy like the persecution of Falun Gong, could be seen as a challenge to the unity of the Party and could cause internal rifts.
Second, on the “Legacy Trap”: Mr. Xi inherited a “legacy” from Jiang Zemin, which is the persecution of Falun Gong. This “legacy” has created a huge apparatus (the 610 Office, the system of labor camps, prisons, hospitals involved in organ harvesting…), a network of interest groups related to the persecution, and a large number of officials who are “implicated.” Dealing with this “legacy” is not simple. If Mr. Xi were to forcefully overturn it, he could create a strong wave of opposition from those whose interests are tied to the persecution, or those who fear being held accountable.
Third, on the priority of consolidating personal power: In his early years in power, and even later, one of Mr. Xi’s top priorities has been to consolidate his personal power and eliminate political rivals through the “tiger and fly” anti-corruption campaign. He may see dealing with rival factions, especially the remnants of the Jiang Zemin faction, as a prerequisite before he can touch on thorny issues like Falun Gong. However, his anti-corruption campaign, while it has touched some high-level figures in Jiang’s faction, seems not to have reached the root of the crimes related to Falun Gong.
Fourth, on the fear of a “domino effect”: If he admits the mistake and resolves the Falun Gong issue, it could set a “precedent,” leading to demands to review other historical issues (like Tiananmen, the Cultural Revolution…), and could ultimately shake the foundation of the regime. This is something that any CCP leader tries to avoid.
So, the image of “riding the tiger” is very accurate. Mr. Xi may not have been the one who actively “got on this tiger” (as it was already there from his predecessor’s time), but once on it, controlling it or finding a way to get off safely is extremely difficult. Any move could cause unforeseen reactions.
Mr. Xi’s silence or ambiguity on the Falun Gong issue could be interpreted as a strategy of “biding his time” while he tries to consolidate power and deal with other challenges. Or, more sadly, it could be a tacit acceptance, a continuation of the old policy for the reasons mentioned above.
Either way, a leader who does not dare or is unable to face and correct the mistakes and crimes of the past will always be a burden to himself and to the entire nation. History will be the judge of that.
Sophia Bell:
I’m thinking, could there be a situation where, even now, Mr. Xi himself doesn’t know the extent of the evil of the persecution of Falun Gong?… Much like Mr. Liu’s own case, before your daughter was harmed, you also didn’t know the truth of this persecution…
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia’s question, he frowns slightly, pondering for a moment. This is a very sharp and thought-provoking question.)
Ms. Sophia, this is a possibility that perhaps we should not completely rule out, although it seems hard to believe for someone in a position of supreme power like Mr. Xi Jinping.
(He pauses, choosing his words carefully.)
When I look back at my own case, it’s true that I was in an “information bubble” created by the system. Although I was a provincial-level official with my own information channels, on “sensitive” and tightly controlled issues like Falun Gong, what reached me was still mainly directed and filtered information. I didn’t know, or didn’t want to know, or didn’t dare to find out the full truth until tragedy struck my family.
So, could Mr. Xi Jinping, the leader of an entire nation, also be in a similar state of “information blindness” regarding the extent of the evil of the Falun Gong persecution, especially about the crime of organ harvesting?
I think there are a few factors to consider:
First, the system of reporting and “filtering” information: In a dictatorial system, information is often heavily “filtered” as it moves from the bottom up. Subordinates tend to report what their superiors want to hear, concealing negative information and truths that could be disadvantageous. Information about excessive brutality, serious human rights violations, may not have been reported fully and truthfully to the highest level, or may have been greatly downplayed.
Second, the encirclement by interest groups: Those who directly participated in and benefited from the persecution, especially those deeply “implicated” in the crime of organ harvesting, will do everything to hide the truth, to prevent information from reaching Mr. Xi. They might create a wall of information around him, providing only “processed” reports.
Third, the leader’s priorities: A supreme leader faces countless domestic and foreign issues. It’s possible that, for a long time, the Falun Gong issue was not Mr. Xi’s top priority, and he relied on reports from specialized agencies (like the security system, the 610 Office) without independent verification.
However, there are also factors that make us doubt the possibility of Mr. Xi being “completely unaware”:
First, the “tiger and fly” anti-corruption campaign: In the process of purging political rivals, especially high-ranking figures from Jiang Zemin’s faction (like Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong…), these individuals were all deeply involved in the persecution of Falun Gong and the crime of organ harvesting. It’s hard to believe that during the investigations, information about these crimes did not reach Mr. Xi’s ears at all, even if it was not made public.
Second, information from the international community: Although the CCP tries to cover it up, the reports, resolutions, and hearings by human rights organizations and international parliaments about organ harvesting in China surely could not have completely bypassed Mr. Xi’s intelligence and information systems.
Third, the persistent nature of the issue: The persecution of Falun Gong has lasted for over 20 years; it is a major issue affecting China’s international reputation. A leader with Mr. Xi’s vision and grasp of information would find it hard to be completely “oblivious” to such a long-standing and serious issue.
Therefore, in my personal speculation, the situation may be more complex than “completely unaware.” It’s possible that Mr. Xi knows to some extent, but the detailed extent and true brutality of the crime, he may not have fully grasped, or it may have been downplayed by misinformation. Or it could be that he knows but, due to political calculations and considerations of power, he has chosen “not to know more,” or to “temporarily set it aside.”
Like in my case, perhaps it would take a certain “shock,” a special event, to make someone in Mr. Xi’s position truly confront the full, horrific truth. But whether that “shock” will come, and whether he will have the courage to act, is another question.
These are just my personal speculations, based on my experience and observation. The inner workings of the CCP are always an unpredictable “black box.”
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods in agreement with Mr. Liu’s caution.)
Mr. Liu has provided a very pertinent and balanced analysis. Whether a supreme leader like Xi Jinping is “completely unaware” of the extent of the evil of the Falun Gong persecution is a complex question.
I agree that the possibility of being “completely unaware” is very low, especially after more than a decade in power and with what has transpired during his anti-corruption campaign.
However, there is a concept in the study of totalitarian regimes called “willful ignorance” or “plausible deniability.”
Regarding Willful Ignorance: The leader might intentionally not want to delve deep into the darkest aspects, the specific crimes, to avoid direct moral or legal responsibility. They might tacitly allow or condone subordinates to do the “dirty work,” as long as the political goal is achieved.
Regarding Pausible Deniability: Subordinates might intentionally not report the details of brutal acts to their superiors, so that the superiors can “plausibly deny” knowing about those crimes if questioned later. This is a way to protect the “top leader.”
In Mr. Xi’s case, it could be a combination of many factors:
First, he might know that the persecution of Falun Gong is brutal, but not fully grasp the extent of the savagery of organ harvesting on an industrial scale.
Second, he might have received reports that were “beautified” or “downplayed” by intelligence and security agencies.
Third, he might be prioritizing other issues that he considers “existential” to the survival of the regime and his personal power, and is temporarily “turning a blind eye” or postponing dealing with the Falun Gong issue.
And fourth, as Mr. Liu said, the fear of “opening Pandora’s box,” the fear of a-unforeseen consequences if this case is overturned, is also a very large barrier.
Therefore, instead of “completely unaware,” it is perhaps more accurate to say that Mr. Xi might be in a state of “knowing but not wanting to fully confront,” or “knowing but not yet able to/daring to act decisively” due to complex political calculations.
However, as the head of state, the ultimate responsibility still rests with him. “Not knowing” (to whatever extent) cannot be an excuse for not stopping and punishing the crimes against humanity happening under his rule. History will record that.
Sophia Bell:
Yes, I thought of this hypothesis for two reasons:
First, we see in history that there have been many emperors who were kept in the dark by their officials, causing them not to know the corruption of the country, still thinking the country was “at peace”;
Second, in Mr. Xi’s case, in reality, he may have never had direct contact with any Falun Gong practitioners or witnesses, and all the information he receives is based on reports from his subordinates…
Additionally, I once heard someone share that Mr. Xi is in a situation where “the government’s orders cannot get out of Zhongnanhai,” meaning that his orders are not fully transmitted and are not taken seriously…
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu listens to the reasons Sophia provides, he nods, his expression showing understanding and agreement with those analyses.)
Ms. Sophia, the reasons you have given to support the hypothesis that Mr. Xi may not grasp the full truth are very thought-provoking, and they reflect the inherent realities in centralized power systems.
Regarding emperors being kept in the dark:
Just as you said, the history of China and other countries has countless examples of emperors, those who held supreme power, living in a “separate world” created by their courtiers and officials. They only heard good words, reports of achievements, while the harsh truths, the suffering of the people, the corruption of the bureaucracy were skillfully hidden.
The purpose of this concealment could be to curry favor with the emperor, to cover up their own incompetence or corruption, or to avoid unnecessary wrath. The result is that the emperor thinks the country is in a state of “peace and prosperity,” while in reality, it may have been rotting from within.
In a system like the CCP, where loyalty to a superior (and protecting the interests of one’s faction) is often placed higher than the truth, the risk of the “supreme leader being kept in the dark” is very real.
Regarding the possibility that Mr. Xi has never had direct contact with Falun Gong practitioners or witnesses:
This is also a very high probability. A leader in Mr. Xi’s position is usually protected by many layers of security and information. The chance of him meeting and listening directly to a Falun Gong practitioner recount what they have been through, or a witness to the crime of organ harvesting, is almost impossible.
Any information that reaches him on this issue will certainly have passed through many layers of “filtering” by the security, propaganda, and specialized agencies. These reports, as I have said, have very likely been “edited” to fit the “general line” or to not cause “alarm” for the leadership.
Without direct contact, without a perspective from the reality of the victims, it is very difficult for a leader to feel the full extent of the brutality and injustice of a policy. They only see dry numbers and reports, not the pain and tears of flesh-and-blood human beings.
Regarding “the government’s orders cannot get out of Zhongnanhai”:
This is a very interesting observation and may also reflect part of the reality of the power struggle in China. Although Mr. Xi has consolidated immense power and eliminated many rivals, it does not mean he has absolute control over every corner of the vast apparatus.
There may be interest groups, hidden “emperor emeritus” figures, or underground forces in the localities, in the military, in the security system, who are still trying to obstruct, weaken, or distort Mr. Xi’s directives, if those directives go against their interests.
If this is true, then even if Mr. Xi intends to change a certain policy (for example, the policy towards Falun Gong), his orders may not be fully and seriously implemented at the lower levels, or may be deliberately distorted. “The top has policies, the bottom has countermeasures” is not a rare phenomenon in China.
This also means that Mr. Xi may be facing a persistent, underlying power struggle, and resolving the Falun Gong issue, if at all, will depend on whether he can truly get a grip on the “steering wheel” of the entire machine.
All of these factors, Ms. Sophia, contribute to making the picture more complex. It shows that even a leader with supreme power can be isolated in terms of information, limited in the execution of his will, and face invisible but very strong resistance from the very system he heads.
This does not diminish the leader’s responsibility, but it helps us to better understand the difficulties and complexities they may be facing, and why positive changes sometimes happen slowly or not as expected.
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods in agreement.)
The points that Ms. Sophia and Mr. Liu have just analyzed are extremely pertinent. The phenomenon of “information cocoons” surrounding high-level leaders is a well-studied issue in political science. The greater the power, the higher the risk of being isolated from reality by those around them.
And the phrase “政令不出中南海” (the government’s orders cannot get out of Zhongnanhai) is a classic description of power fragmentation or covert opposition within the Chinese political system, even under leaders who are considered the strongest. It shows the complexity of governing a vast country with a huge bureaucracy and many different layers of interests.
If Mr. Xi is truly in that situation, then the possibility that he “doesn’t know” or “can’t do” certain things, while it may seem hard to believe, is a possibility that needs to be seriously considered. This further emphasizes the importance of independent voices, of information from the outside, to be able to penetrate those “information walls.”
Sophia Bell:
Yes, let’s suppose our readers at THE LIVES MEDIA read up to this point, they might have a question: “Emperors in the past didn’t have the Internet, so being kept in the dark is understandable; but what about today’s society, with the explosion of the Internet? Surely he knows how to search the Internet?”
Therefore, Mr. Liu, in the past, in your various positions within the CCP regime, when using the Internet, were you blocked by the Great Firewall, or did you even realize you were being blocked? And could Mr. Xi be blocked by his own Great Firewall system?
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia’s question and smiles faintly, a smile that is somewhat bitter and understanding.)
Ms. Sophia, this is a very practical question and accurately reflects the query of many people living in societies with a free Internet. “Why not just search the Internet?” – it sounds simple, but the reality in China is extremely complex.
(He pauses, as if to choose his words precisely.)
When I was still working in the system, in various positions, our use of the Internet also had certain regulations and limitations, although perhaps not as harsh as for ordinary people in some aspects.
Regarding the Great Firewall: Yes, this firewall system is very effective. For the vast majority of people, accessing foreign websites considered “sensitive” like Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and major international news sites (BBC, New York Times, The LIVES Times…) is completely blocked. If they want to access them, they have to use circumvention tools (VPNs), but the use of VPNs is also increasingly being tightened and can carry legal risks.
For cadres and civil servants:
In some agencies, especially those related to research, foreign affairs, or security, there may be “special channels” or “exceptions” that allow access to certain foreign websites for work purposes. However, these accesses are often closely monitored.
Even when access is possible, the mentality of self-censorship is very strong. We knew that every action online could be tracked. Searching for “sensitive” or “reactionary” information could bring unnecessary trouble, affecting one’s career, and even the safety of oneself and one’s family. Therefore, many people, even if they had the ability, would not dare or would not want to search for information that goes against the official mainstream.
Furthermore, internal information sources (internal news bulletins, confidential documents, directives from superiors) were often considered “more important,” “more reliable” than the “floating” information on the external Internet, which was seen as “hostile” and “distorted.” There was a trust (or a forced trust) in the Party’s official information system.
Did I personally realize I was being blocked? Yes, of course. When trying to access some international news sites or free discussion forums, error messages or pages that wouldn’t load were common occurrences. But as I said, trying to “jump the wall” to find that information was not a priority, and it also carried risks. We were used to living in a “controlled information space.”
So, could Mr. Xi Jinping be blocked by his own Great Firewall?
This is an interesting question.
Technically: With his position, he certainly has unlimited access to any source of information in the world, if he wants to. The Great Firewall is a tool to control the people, not to restrict the supreme leader.
But the problem is not just technical, but also about the “human filter” and the “psychological filter”:
First, the human filter: What information will the people around Mr. Xi – his secretaries, advisors, intelligence and security agencies – present to him? Would they dare to present dissenting information, harsh truths from the “outside” Internet that go against his or the Party’s views? Or will they also “filter” the information, only providing what is “suitable,” “beneficial”?
Second, the psychological filter: Even if Mr. Xi could “Google” it himself, would he have the time, the patience, and most importantly, the openness to accept information that is completely contrary to what he has believed and what his system has reported to him? Is it easy for a person at the pinnacle of power, surrounded by praise and “beautified” reports, to accept that he has been deceived or that his system is committing horrific crimes?
Furthermore, searching for information on the Internet also requires the skill to distinguish fact from fiction, to cross-reference sources. In an environment where he is accustomed to receiving “official” information, “swimming” on his own in the mixed sea of global Internet information may not be the usual working method of such a leader.
Therefore, although Mr. Xi is not technically blocked by the Great Firewall, he may be “blocked” by another “invisible firewall”, which is his system of advisors, the bureaucracy, and also his own prejudices and political priorities.
In short, having the Internet does not equate to having freedom of information, especially for those in a closed and tightly controlled system like China. And even for the top leader, accessing and accepting the truth is not as simple as “searching Google.”
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods in agreement with Mr. Liu’s analysis.)
Mr. Liu has explained it very clearly and realistically. I would just like to add one small point.
In addition to the “filters” that Mr. Liu mentioned, there is another factor: “confirmation bias.” People tend to search for and believe in information that confirms what they already believe, and ignore or doubt information that is contrary.
For a leader who has been shaped by a certain ideology, who has made policies based on “official” information, actively seeking and accepting completely opposite information on the Internet is a huge psychological challenge.
They might view such information as “products of hostile forces,” as “fake news,” or “slander.” The CCP’s propaganda system is also very good at creating “counter-narratives” to neutralize unfavorable information from the outside.
Therefore, even with the tool of the Internet, it is very difficult for a supreme leader of China to “see” the truth in the same way that we in the free world see it, and it depends on many complex factors, not just simple technical access.
Sophia Bell:
Yes, in Mr. Xi’s case, even if we assume he is not blocked by the Great Firewall, the likelihood of him searching for information via the Internet is not high… he may not even use a computer or smartphone himself, for “security” reasons.
Regarding the Great Firewall, I encountered a situation like this: just the other day, when I tried using an AI application that has been much talked about in the press recently, called DeepSeek, I tried asking it a simple question: “What do you know about Falun Gong?” Can you two guess how it answered me?
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia recount her experience with the AI application, he frowns slightly, a smile that is both knowing and bitter appears.)
Ms. Sophia, this is a very interesting and thought-provoking situation in the context of today’s technology. The fact that high-level leaders may not directly use computers or smartphones for “security” reasons is entirely possible. They usually have a whole team of assistants and secretaries to handle technology and information-related matters. This further increases the role of the “human filters” we talked about.
As for your question to the AI application DeepSeek… (He pauses, looking at Sophia and Julian, as if waiting for confirmation of his guess).
If DeepSeek is an AI application developed or operating under the control, or at least under the influence, of the censorship system in China, then I can guess that its answer about Falun Gong would be very… “cautious,” if not completely aligned with the authorities’ direction.
Perhaps it would:
First, give a vague, evasive answer: For example: “Falun Gong is a complex topic with many differing opinions. I cannot provide detailed information on this matter.” Or, “I am an AI language model and do not have the ability to make judgments on religious or political issues.”
Second, repeat the official propaganda rhetoric of the CCP: It might describe Falun Gong with negative terms, with the false information that their propaganda machine has sown, for example, “banned in China,” “related to illegal activities”…
Third, completely refuse to answer or report an error: Simply provide no information at all, or display an error message that it cannot process the request.
I don’t think an AI application operating in that environment could give an objective, truthful answer, talking about the health benefits, the moral values of Falun Gong, or mentioning the brutal persecution that practitioners are enduring. The Great Firewall is not just a firewall that blocks Internet access; it is also a content censorship system, a thought-directing system that has seeped into technological products like AI.
That is my guess, Ms. Bell. I am very curious to know what DeepSeek’s actual answer was.
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods, showing great interest in Sophia’s story.)
This is a very good example of how information control can extend into the field of artificial intelligence, Ms. Sophia. Mr. Liu has made very pertinent guesses.
Large AI models, especially those trained or fine-tuned by Chinese companies, or those that want to operate in the Chinese market, will certainly have to comply with the government’s censorship regulations. Their training data may have been “cleaned” to remove “sensitive” information, or they are programmed to give “safe,” directed answers.
I also lean towards the possibility that DeepSeek would either:
Give a very brief, neutral answer to the point of being meaningless, providing no valuable information whatsoever.
Or, if it’s a bit more “clever” in its evasion, it might selectively quote information from official Chinese sources, which is to say, repeat the propaganda rhetoric.
For an AI to “evade” or “distort” the truth about Falun Gong, if that is the case, would be another testament to the fact that the Great Firewall is not just a technical barrier, but also a tool for shaping perception, an effort to control thought on a large scale, even in the era of AI.
I would also very much like to know what its actual answer was. This could give us another perspective on the extent and manner in which censorship is being applied in new technologies.
Sophia Bell:
Yes, among the guesses you both just made, one was correct, which was Mr. Liu’s third guess, that it “Completely refused to answer or reported an error.” I was quite surprised! It didn’t evade vaguely, but outright reported an error, accompanied by a line notifying me that I had “violated their usage policy.” Just for one question!
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia’s answer, he nods gently, a sad smile on his lips. There is no look of pride for having guessed correctly, but rather a confirmation of what he already knew too well about this system.)
So my third guess was correct… “Completely refused to answer or reported an error.” And it even came with a notice that you had “violated their policy.” (He shakes his head slowly).
This, Ms. Sophia, Mr. Julian, does not surprise me, but it still fills me with a deep sadness. It shows that even a tool that is supposed to be “artificial intelligence,” designed to provide information, has been “programmed” to fear the truth, to avoid issues that the authorities deem “sensitive.”
The fact that it notified you of “violating the policy” for simply asking a simple question about Falun Gong, an objectively existing entity, shows how deeply censorship and ideological imposition have taken root. They don’t just block information; they also want to brand the very act of being curious, of inquiring about those topics, as “wrong,” as a “violation.”
This also reflects something I said earlier: the Great Firewall is not just a technical firewall. It is a comprehensive system of thought control. It creates an environment where truth is suffocated, and even the most modern tools must bend to comply with those irrational “policies.”
It’s truly sad to see technology, which should serve to broaden knowledge and connect people, being turned into a tool to reinforce censorship and maintain ignorance.
This is a very specific and vivid example, showing the challenges we face when trying to find and share the truth in such a tightly controlled environment. Thank you for sharing this experience. It really clarifies a great deal.
Julian Lee: (Julian’s expression is serious, he jots something down in his notebook.)
The information Ms. Sophia just provided about DeepSeek’s response is extremely valuable. The fact that an AI refuses to answer and reports a “policy violation” when asked about Falun Gong is concrete evidence that tech companies, especially those with ties to the Chinese market, are under immense censorship pressure.
This has several important implications:
First, the spread of censorship into the field of AI: It shows that the CCP’s war on information control has expanded to AI platforms. Large language models are becoming a new “front line” in shaping public perception.
Second, pre-programmed “policies”: The AI reporting a “policy violation” indicates that censorship rules have been built into its algorithm or training dataset. This is not a random error, but a deliberate design.
Third, the risk of a distorted “AI worldview”: If AI models, which are becoming increasingly important in providing information and assisting humans, are “taught” to evade or distort the truth about important issues, then the risk of a generation of users (especially in China) having a distorted worldview is very high.
Fourth, a challenge to academic freedom and research: If even asking a question about a topic is considered a “policy violation,” then how can there be free and objective academic research and discussion?
Ms. Sophia’s experience is a classic example of how the “soft power” of censorship is being applied. It’s not just about blocking access, but about creating an environment where certain topics become “untouchable,” even for artificial intelligence.
This further emphasizes the importance of developing and protecting open, transparent AI platforms that are not dominated by totalitarian regimes, to ensure that this technology truly serves the interests of humanity, not as a tool for oppression and control.
Thank you for sharing this very timely and alarming detail.
Sophia Bell:
Speaking of which, we can see that no matter how great the CCP’s evil is, people inside and outside of China are still more or less affected by the Great Firewall when trying to find the truth via the internet, making it difficult for them to access more objective, multi-faceted information.
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu nods slowly, his eyes showing a trace of sadness but also full of understanding.)
Ms. Sophia is very right. The CCP’s Great Firewall is not just a mere technical barrier for people within the country. Its influence, whether direct or indirect, can spread beyond its borders and affect people who are trying to understand the truth about China from all over the world.
(He pauses, thinking about the ways the Great Firewall can exert its influence.)
For people inside China:
First, information isolation: This is the most obvious impact. They are cut off from the free flow of world information. What they know about domestic and international events is mainly through the lens that has been “edited” and directed by the Communist Party. This creates a “parallel reality,” where objective truth is distorted or completely hidden.
Second, a mentality of fear and self-censorship: Even if someone manages to circumvent the firewall, the fear of being monitored and punished also makes them self-censor their behavior online, not daring to express dissenting opinions, not daring to search for “sensitive” information. Over time, it becomes a habit, a conditioned reflex.
Third, difficulty in distinguishing fact from fiction: When exposed only to one-sided information for a long time, people’s ability for critical thinking and distinguishing real from fake information is diminished. They easily believe state propaganda and are skeptical of information from the outside.
For people outside of China:
First, difficulty in accessing authentic information from within: Journalists, researchers, and international human rights organizations face great difficulties when trying to understand the real situation in China. Interviewing witnesses and collecting evidence becomes dangerous and restricted. The Great Firewall makes it harder for information from within the country to get out.
Second, the spread of disinformation and propaganda: The CCP not only builds the Great Firewall to block information, but they also proactively use the Internet to spread disinformation and propaganda campaigns to the outside world through state-run media in foreign languages, “sock puppet” social media accounts, or by influencing international media platforms. This can create information noise and reduce trust in independent sources.
Third, influence on tech companies and global platforms: As in the case of DeepSeek that Ms. Sophia just shared, or other large tech companies that want to operate in the Chinese market, they may have to accept “playing by Beijing’s rules,” which means implementing content censorship and cooperating with the authorities in monitoring users. This indirectly extends the reach of the Great firewall beyond its borders.
Fourth, the hesitance of individuals and organizations to criticize China: The fear of economic retaliation, cyber-attacks, or sanctions from China can also make some individuals and organizations abroad more cautious when speaking out on sensitive issues.
Thus, no matter how great the CCP’s crimes are, the Great Firewall remains an effective tool for them to cover up, distort the truth, and create difficulties for efforts to seek justice. It is not just a problem for the Chinese people, but also a challenge to freedom of information and truth on a global scale.
Our sitting here, trying to share and clarify these things, is also an effort to help break through that “firewall,” even if only in a small way.
Julian Lee:
(Julian nods, adding the perspective of an international journalist.)
Mr. Liu has analyzed the impacts of the Great Firewall very comprehensively. I completely agree.
From my experience as a journalist, I see that the Great Firewall is not just a censorship system; it also creates a “closed information ecosystem” in China. In that ecosystem, “domestic” applications, platforms, and content are prioritized for development and domination, while external competitors are blocked. This makes the Chinese people increasingly dependent on domestic services, which are easily controlled and monitored by the authorities.
And as Mr. Liu said, its influence does not stop at the border. We are seeing a global “information war,” where totalitarian regimes like China are becoming more and more sophisticated in using technology for propaganda, influence, and to weaken democracies. They learn very quickly the techniques of spreading fake news, using AI to create false content, and attacking the weaknesses of free societies.
The fact that AI platforms like DeepSeek have to “comply with policy” when asked about Falun Gong is an alarming example. It shows that, without vigilance and clear regulations on AI ethics and the transparency of training data, we risk creating technological tools that serve the purpose of censorship and propaganda, rather than serving truth and freedom.
The fight against the Great Firewall and similar information control efforts is, therefore, not just a fight for the Chinese people, but a fight for all who cherish truth, freedom of speech, and a healthy, trustworthy cyberspace.
Sophia Bell:
I just thought of a concluding sentence like this: Wherever there is information control, there is something evil being hidden…
Do you both think so?
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia’s concluding thought, he nods slowly, a deep agreement evident in his eyes. He is silent for a moment, as if contemplating that summary, then speaks slowly.)
Ms. Sophia, that sentence of yours, “Wherever there is information control, there is something evil being hidden”… it is concise, succinct, yet it encapsulates a very bitter and universal truth.
(He pauses, looks at Sophia and Julian, then continues.)
From my own experience, as someone who was once in a tightly controlled information system, and later as someone trying to seek the truth, I completely agree with that assertion.
Why must information be controlled? If a government is truly clean, truly for the people, if the policies they enact truly benefit the majority, then what do they have to fear from the truth? What do they have to hide? On the contrary, they would want information to be transparent, so that the people can understand and support them.
What is information control meant to hide? Usually, it is to hide weakness, corruption, wrong policies, illegal acts, and especially crimes against the people. When the truth is exposed, their prestige will collapse, their power will be shaken. Therefore, they must use every means to cover up, to control the flow of information, to maintain a false image.
Information control is a sign of a lack of confidence and fear. A strong government, confident in its own righteousness, would not need to fear dissenting opinions or criticism. They would be willing to engage in open dialogue and debate. Only the weak, those who know they are in the wrong, have to resort to censorship and suppression to silence others.
The persecution of Falun Gong is a classic example. If Falun Gong were truly an “evil cult” as they propagandize, why would they need to ban its books and materials, to block all websites that speak about Falun Gong objectively? Why would they have to fear the accounts of practitioners, the evidence of the crime of organ harvesting? It is because they know that the truth is not on their side. It is because what they are doing is evil, is a crime, that they must try at all costs to hide it.
Your sentence, it is not only true for China, but perhaps true for any place in the world, in any era, where freedom of information is trampled upon. It’s like a law. Darkness always fears the light. Lies always fear the truth.
That is a very good summary, Ms. Bell. It makes one think.
Julian Lee: (Julian nods decisively, showing clear agreement.)
I completely agree with Ms. Sophia’s concluding thought and Mr. Liu’s analysis. It is an extremely accurate and highly universal assertion.
In the field of journalism and the study of freedom of speech, there is an unwritten rule: The level of information censorship by a government is often directly proportional to the level of wrongdoing and shady dealings that government is hiding.
An open, transparent society, where information flows freely, where the press can perform its role of monitoring and critique, is usually a society with lower levels of corruption, higher government accountability, and where the people are more respected.
Conversely, in places where information is tightly controlled, where the state monopolizes the truth, where dissenting voices are suppressed, that is often fertile ground for abuse of power, corruption, injustice, and systematic crimes.
China’s Great Firewall is an extreme manifestation of information control to hide evil things. Its purpose is not only to prevent people from accessing the truth, but also to maintain an “official narrative” written by the Communist Party, a narrative that glorifies reality and demonizes anyone who dares to challenge it.
Ms. Sophia’s sentence can be considered a simple but effective “litmus test” to assess the nature of any regime. If they fear information, if they try to silence the people, then there is definitely something very wrong, very evil, happening behind that curtain of censorship.
This is a powerful reminder of the importance of freedom of information and the role of those who dare to seek and speak the truth, wherever they may be.
Sophia Bell:
And in a place with such information censorship, it’s very easy for many lives to be pushed into tragic situations without anyone knowing…
Speaking of which, it makes me think of the topic: how to build a better country, where people will at a minimum have freedom of speech?
You are both people who are interested in philosophy, leadership ideology, and the building of political institutions… so I think you will be very interested in questions on this topic and will have in-depth interpretations…
But our time today is nearing noon, perhaps we should leave this topic for tomorrow morning? What do you think?
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu hears Sophia introduce the new topic, his eyes light up a bit, showing clear interest. However, he also looks at his watch and nods in agreement with Sophia’s proposal.)
Ms. Sophia, the topic you just raised – “how to build a better country, where people will at a minimum have freedom of speech” – is indeed an immense issue, a concern not only of my own but perhaps of anyone who desires a just, civilized, and progressive society.
That is a question I tried to find an answer to throughout my years of research and even when I entered politics, although at that time, my thoughts might have been limited and influenced by prejudice. And now, with what I have been through, with the new understanding from the path of cultivation, I ponder it even more deeply.
Factors like the foundational philosophy, the leader’s ideology, the way institutions are built… they all play an extremely important role in shaping a nation.
I am very interested and willing to share my thoughts on this topic. However, you are right, there isn’t much time left this morning. This is a large topic that requires enough time for us to delve into its aspects thoroughly.
Therefore, I completely agree with your proposal. We will dedicate tomorrow morning to focus on discussing this issue. I believe that with Julian’s participation as well, we will have a very rich and rewarding discussion. I will have more time to reflect and systemize my ideas for tomorrow’s discussion.
Julian Lee:
(in a tone of interest, using this opportunity to introduce his book)
I am in complete agreement with Ms. Sophia and Mr. Liu. The topic of building a better country, especially ensuring the right to freedom of speech, is one of the greatest challenges and also the noblest goals of any civilized society.
This is also an area where I have spent a lot of time researching. Ms. Sophia, Mr. Liu, I am truly very interested in the topics we will be discussing tomorrow. For the past few years, my work has also focused quite a bit on understanding the thinking and legacy of leaders after they leave power. I have had the opportunity to meet and interview many former high-ranking officials and some former heads of state.
There is one particular interview that I have devoted a great deal of passion and time to recently, and that is with a former President. It was a multi-day dialogue, going deep into the most important decisions of his term, his reflections, what he learned, and most importantly, how he wants his legacy to be remembered.
A book that I am in the process of completing, with the title “AFTER POWER: THE LEGACY – A Conversation with a former President”. The manuscript has also received some positive initial feedback from test readers.
(Julian Lee takes a carefully bound manuscript from his briefcase.)
On that note, Mr. Liu, as we will be discussing these topics tomorrow, if you don’t mind, I would like to gift you a copy of the manuscript to look over tonight. I believe that with your experience and erudition, reading about the reflections of another leader after leaving office, and then your own sharing about “power” and “legacy” from your unique perspective, will bring invaluable contributions to our discussion.
Mr. Liu Siyuan:
(Mr. Liu is a little surprised but also shows appreciation, accepting the manuscript.)
Oh, thank you, Mr. Julian. This is truly a meaningful and very timely gift. “AFTER POWER: THE LEGACY”… the title is very thought-provoking. I will definitely read it carefully tonight. And I am also very much looking forward to our discussion tomorrow; there will certainly be much more to reflect on.
Sophia Bell:
Wonderful! So, I’ll see you both tomorrow morning. I’m sure we will have another valuable sharing session.
(…..)
This article is an excerpt from the book “THE RED VEIL” – a series of exclusive interviews by journalist Sophia Bell with a former official in the Chinese Communist government.
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